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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most notable, or at least the most noted, form of property 
evolution has been the transfer of exclusive rights from collectives to 
individuals and vice versa. The competition between individual and 
collective property, according to Harold Demsetz, was a main theme of the 
20th century.1 Attention has been primarily on the radical property reforms 
that resulted in the shift of exclusive control over resources from one to 
another, such as the farm collectivization in Soviet Union or the 
establishment of the People’s Communes in Mao’s China and their 
reversals.2 It is undeniably true that a sudden and fundamental change in 
the form of ownership of an entire society or economic sector is exciting. 
That is perhaps why the literature on the evolution of property rights has 
focused on the transition from communal to private, or the reverse.3 Such 
radical moments, however, constitute only a small part of history. For the 
most part, property rights evolve quietly and incrementally, which is hard to 
explain if we take exclusive rights as the core of property, or, to put it more 
generally, if we are focusing solely on the question of who owns the things.4 
This Essay argues that the right to exclude is not always at the heart of 
property evolution, and, further, that other sticks in the bundle of property 
rights can play a central role in property evolution. As we demonstrate with 
the Chinese example, the metaphor of “bundle of rights” can better capture 
the nuanced, flexible, and idiosyncratic processes that have actually 
characterized the evolution of property rights. 
To describe the evolution of property rights in China, we employ the 
concept of relational property. It is a concept that is heavily influenced by 
Joseph William Singer’s “social relations model” 5  and Ian Macneil’s 
“relational contract”6 and, in particular, their emphasis on the determinative 
 
 1.  See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition 
Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653 (2002).  
 2.  Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318 (1993).  
 3.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002) (summarizing scholarship in response to the 
Demsetz thesis). 
 4.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 
(2012) (suggesting property law is best understood as a system of laws with many parts). 
 5.  See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, 
in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3 (Charles Geisler 
& Gail Daneker eds., 2000) [hereinafter Singer, Property and Social Relations]; Joseph William 
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, The 
Reliance Interest in Property]. 
 6.  See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter 
Macneil, Contracts]; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. 
L. REV. 483; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 877 (2000). 
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role of social relations in the construction of property and contract rights. 
The bundle of sticks metaphor is at the heart of relational property because 
it recognizes that property rights can be, and often are, disaggregated as 
they adapt to changing social, economic, and technological demands. As we 
will show in the context of the reform of Chinese rural land, the 
combination of the metaphor of separable interests—the sticks in the 
bundle—and the dependence of property interests on social relationships 
can explain the evolution of property rights more accurately than a 
perspective that stresses a single central meaning of property. 
The core of our argument is simple: it is analytically more accurate to 
define each stakeholder’s specific interests in rural land than to answer the 
question of legal title. Identifying the distinct powers of developing and 
transferring rural land, for example, tells us more about control of the land 
than the right to exclude. What’s more important, when property law lags 
behind property relations, the latter will prevail and shape the eventual 
allocation of economic, social, and political powers. It is the social relations 
of particular villages in similar or identical institutional structures that 
determine their future development. Different villages make different and 
even opposite property arrangements. The normative implication is that 
relational property can function without property law, but property law 
cannot function without embedding itself in social relations. 
The rest of this Essay is structured as follows: Part II criticizes the in rem 
view of the evolution of property rights. Part III develops the concept of 
relational property and evaluates its compatibility with the bottom-up 
evolution of property rights. Part IV utilizes the concept of relational 
property to analyze Chinese rural land reform. Part V concludes. 
II. IN REM PROPERTY AND THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Who is eligible to serve as an owner of property? Individual persons, 
close-knit communities, and governments “all can and do own property.”7 
But what do property rights mean? Some scholars believe that property is a 
bundle of rights and indicates which of the designated individuals is entitled 
to engage in which uses of particular resources.8 This in personam approach 
defines property as social relations between persons with respect to 
resources and is analogized to a bundle of rights. Another school of thought 
holds that “property is a distinctive type of right to a thing, good against the 
world.”9 This in rem concept of property consists of two parts. The first part 
 
 7.  THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: 
PROPERTY 3 (2010).  
 8.  Id. at 4–5.  
 9.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001).  
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is the emphasis on “property as the law of things.”10 As Henry E. Smith 
argues, “the definition of a thing and its role in mediating private 
interactions lie at the heart of property.”11 The “thing” plays a role in 
depersonalizing and formalizing property relations.12 In general, this in rem 
concept views property as the relationship between human beings and 
resources, instead of a web of social relations among human beings. “First, it 
identifies particular resources (‘things’), and specifies which person (the 
‘owner’) is to act as the gatekeeper or regulator of the thing.”13 Things are 
“modules” through which law can organize the complex relationships into 
“lumpy packages” of legal relations.14 This approach, according to Yun-chien 
Chang and Smith, presents a structured bundle of relationships that minimize 
information costs.15 
The second part of this in rem theory of property is the emphasis on 
the right to exclude. The right to exclude others from some definite thing is 
central to what the owner owns.16 To describe someone as an owner of some 
thing is to say that such person has the right to exclude others’ use of the 
thing. Thomas Merrill holds that the right to exclude is more than just one 
stick in the bundle of property rights. “Give someone the right to exclude 
others from a valued resource . . . and you give them property. Deny 
someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”17 But Smith 
recently argued that “the right to exclude . . . is not quite a sine qua non” of 
property, and “the characteristic features of property . . . can[not] be 
derived logically from . . . the right to exclude.”18 In the same essay, he 
addresses other property rights, such as the right to transfer and the right to 
use. Chang, also in a recent essay, writes that “ownership” is just one type of 
property right, and he labels the right to transfer and the right to use, 
among others, as “subsidiary rights.”19 Despite these recent elaborations, 
however, the in rem concept retains its long-time emphasis on the right to 
exclude as the natural consequence of defining property as law of things. 
 
 10.  See generally Smith, supra note 4 (asserting that the characterization of property as a 
bundle of rights is flawed).  
 11.  Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM–KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 
95, 123 (2014).  
 12.  See generally id. (explaining that “[p]roperty is the law of things” and does not revolve 
around the right to exclude). 
 13.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 773, 790 (2001).  
 14.  Smith, supra note 4, at 1693.  
 15.  See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common 
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2012); Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept 
and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 103, 108(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015). 
 16.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 360.  
 17.  Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).  
 18.  Smith, supra note 11, at 96, 119.  
 19.  Chang, supra note 15, at 5.  
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Under this view, the first question to ask remains who owns the thing, which 
generally means who is the gatekeeper and has exclusive control over the 
thing. 
Merrill and Smith argue that legal realists and legal economists have 
successfully replaced the traditional in rem concept of property rights with 
the bundle of rights picture.20 According to them, someone who believes 
that property is a right to a thing suffers from a lack of sophistication.21 
Nonetheless, the Blackstonian concept of absolute dominion still dominates 
our imagination of property rights and legal discourse. The standard trilogy 
of private, communal, and state property rights presumes the in rem 
concept of property rights and is evidence of the Blackstonian concept. 
“Theorists push reforms towards one type or the other, but none” has 
substantially challenged the trilogy itself.22 
Private property, despite the inherent ambiguity of its boundaries, is the 
benchmark and starting point of this trilogy. Sir William Blackstone defines 
private property as a man’s “sole and despotic dominion . . . over the 
external things of the world.”23 His is undoubtedly an in rem portrayal of 
property rights. Further, “comm[unal] property designates resources that 
are owned or controlled by a finite number of people who manage the 
resource together and exclude outsiders.”24 Essentially, it is “a regime that 
holds some resources as a commons among a group of ‘insiders,’ but as an 
exclusive right against ‘outsiders.’”25 It is “commons on the inside, [private] 
property on the outside.”26 State property, or centralized property, means 
that the state holds all rights of exclusion and is the sole locus of decision-
making regarding the use of resources.27 Like the definition of private 
property, both communal and state property present a relationship between 
a thing and an owner, in which exclusion is the core. 
This in rem property rights theory also dominates the evolution of 
property rights literature. The majority of existing research, following the 
path-breaking work of Harold Demsetz, focuses on the paradigmatic 
situation in which the evolutionary process starts with open-access or 
communal property and ends with private individualized property. Demsetz 
discussed the emergence of private property among Indians of the Labrador 
 
 20.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 358–59.  
 21.  Id. at 357–58.  
 22.  Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 79, 82 
(2001). 
 23.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  
 24.  Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 557 
(2001).  
 25.  Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).  
 26.  Dagan & Heller, supra note 24, at 557 (quoting Rose, supra note 25, at 155) 
(alteration in original). 
 27.  Heller, supra note 22, at 85.  
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Peninsula in his 1967 article.28 Robert Ellickson explored the switch from 
group ownership to individual ownership using various empirical 
materials.29 Michael Heller investigates the post-communist transitions of 
property regimes in Russia, which aims at the transformation from 
government ownership to private ownership.30 Other scholars, such as Terry 
Anderson, P. J. Hill, D. Bruce Johnsen, John Umbeck, and Barry Field, 
enriched the theory of property rights in different respects, but they 
generally did not go beyond the movement from open-access or communal 
property to individualized private property.31 A few works discuss evolution 
in the reverse direction,32 but overall the contemporary literature on the 
evolution of in rem property rights remains incomplete in three important 
ways. 
First, the concept of exclusion is ambiguous and varies with social, 
institutional, and technological contexts. To cite an illustrative example, in 
one author’s home village in rural China, whenever the door is open, 
villagers are free to enter into a neighbor’s home and even stay there for a 
while to wait for the owner to return. In contrast, in the other author’s 
Manhattan neighborhood, entrance without permission would lead, at least, 
to an immediate 911 call. This contrast is an example, however unscientific, 
of how the specific meaning and the extent of the right to exclude will vary 
with circumstance. 
And circumstance is not limited to the nature of the relevant 
community norms but extends to institutional and technological settings. 
Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed iconized the term “the continuum of 
excludability” in discussing the limits of patents. 33  They argue that 
“excludability is not a binary quality, either ‘on’ or ‘off’ depending on the 
 
 28.  See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350–52 (1967).  
 29.  See generally Ellickson, supra note 2.  
 30.  See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).  
 31.  See generally Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the 
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 
KYKLOS 319 (1989); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the 
Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1986); John Umbeck, The California Gold Rush: 
A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 197 (1977).  
 32.  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access 
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77 (2009) (discussing forces that motivate the shift from 
private ownership to open access); David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S545 (2002) (discussing how the plague impacted feudal 
property institutions); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (discussing the emergence of the open-field 
system from the earlier rough individual tenure). 
 33.  See generally Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits 
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013). 
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availability or absence of property rights.”34 They continue: “Rather, it is 
highly variable across information goods, and is affected not only by formal 
legal entitlements, but also by existing technologies[,] . . . existing social 
norms[,] . . . and the existing institutions . . . .” 35  Recognizing the 
continuum of excludability expands the traditional view of information 
goods based on a rigid view of exclusion and applies not only to intellectual 
property, but also to property theory in general. Given the diversity of legal 
systems, unequal accesses to technologies, decentralized social norms, and 
different institutional environments, as well as different properties of 
different resources, the excludability of resources varies across the spectrum 
from ideal private property to open access. By identifying institutions and 
social norms as key determinants of excludability, Kapczynski and Syed have 
focused on the social relations of information goods rather than on the 
relationship between information goods and their owners.36 The embedded 
picture of property rights in their discussion is in personam rather than in 
rem. 
The standard property trilogy, which uses the right to exclude as one 
criterion, has also been criticized by Heller and Hanoch Dagan. According 
to Dagan and Heller, this familiar conceptual map has limited debate in 
three distinct ways: (1) “the categorization is incomplete,” oversimplified, 
and should include new categories of property, such as anticommons37 and 
semicommons;38 (2) the existing categories, such as private property, may 
themselves be renegotiated and a richer, alternative conception developed; 
and (3) it is also possible to synthesize features of existing property types to 
create vigorous hybrids, such as the liberal commons.39 Their concept of the 
liberal commons focuses on the crucial goals of social relations—individual 
autonomy, interpersonal cooperation, and community prosperity40—rather 
than the relationship between the resources and their owners. 
Second, the in rem concept of property rights overemphasizes the right 
to exclude and falls short of explaining the change of other sticks in the 
bundle of rights. As a result, another trend of the evolution of property 
rights has been ignored in the mainstream law and economics. Following 
are several examples. 
 
 34.  Id. at 1903; compare id., with Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1719, 1755 (2004) (“In an exclusion strategy, the law sets up rough signals (informational 
variables, proxies) defining the boundaries of the asset. Within this zone of protection, owners 
have the choice of how to invest in or consume the asset.”). 
 35.  Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 33, at 1903. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Dagan & Heller, supra note 24, at 558 (citing Heller, supra note 30, at 622–26).   
 38.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open 
Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).  
 39.  See generally Dagan & Heller, supra note 24.  
 40.  Id. at 574. 
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Morton Horwitz documents the transformation in the conception of 
property in the 19th century and argues that the Blackstonian concept of 
ownership necessarily circumscribed the rights of others to develop their 
land.41 As he writes: 
[A]s the spirit of economic development began to take hold of 
American society in the early years of the nineteenth century, 
however, the idea of property underwent a fundamental 
transformation—from a static agrarian conception entitling an 
owner to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic, instrumental, and 
more abstract view of property that emphasized the newly 
paramount virtues of productive use and development.42 
Claire Priest investigates “an issue central to the economic and political 
development of the early United States: laws protecting real property from 
the claims of creditors.”43 Traditional English law protected inheritance “by 
protecting real property from the claims of creditors in multiple ways.”44 
“The legal restrictions on creditors’ ability to seize land in satisfaction of 
debts helped to stabilize the landed class by protecting real-property 
holdings from the risk associated with accumulated unsecured debt.”45 Priest 
shows that: “[T]he status of the American colonies . . . in the British Empire, 
[which was] distinguishable socially and politically from England, and the 
desire among English creditors and colonial subjects to improve credit 
conditions in the Empire led to the removal . . . of traditional English 
protections to land from creditors.”46 
It is a story in which, alienability, rather than the right to exclude, is the 
focus, but nobody would deny that it is an issue essential to the property 
system. Furthermore, Priest highlights the social, economic, and political 
contexts in the evolution of property rights: 
English law reflected a society in which political and social 
authority was vested in a landed class that perpetuated itself 
through long-term ownership of real property. . . . Americans from 
the founding era forward, however, viewed the greater circulation 
of land in America as the basis of a new political ideal—
republicanism—that offered more opportunity for political 
participation than existed in European society.47 
 
 41.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at 32 
(1977). 
 42.  Id. at 31.  
 43.  Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American 
History, 120 HARV. L. REV 385, 385 (2006) (abstract). 
 44.  Id. at 387. 
 45.  Id. at 388. 
 46.  Id. at 389.  
 47.  Id. at 387.  
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In short, the transformation of the American property law resulted from the 
transformation of the economic, political, and social relations.48 
The same can be said of Steven Kochevar’s investigation of the rise of 
institutional mortgage lending in early 19th-century New Haven, 
Connecticut.49 His research also reveals the crucial role of political and 
social relations in the evolution of property rights.50 Specifically, his research 
documents key differences between the elite mortgages made before 1837, 
i.e., “capital allocation that relies on pre-existing social networks,” and the 
later mortgages made by the Town and the Savings Bank, i.e., “capital 
allocation that does not depend on pre-existing social networks.”51 “By 
creating a political forum where economic actors who were not plugged into 
pre-existing elite social networks could present and assemble privately held 
knowledge in a public setting, the Town performed an information-
aggregating service [to facilitate institutional mortgage lending].”52 
Third, Merrill and Smith develop the optimal standardization thesis and 
further the numerus clausus principle based on the in rem concept of 
property rights, which on the whole, overemphasizes the role of law and 
downplays the role of social norms in the evolution of property rights.53 For 
them, the unique advantage of in rem rights is that they conserve 
information costs relative to in personam rights. This is especially true “in 
situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is large, and 
the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”54 Merrill and 
Smith argue that: 
In rem rights offer standardized packages of negative duties of 
abstention that apply automatically to all persons in the society 
when they encounter resources that are marked in the 
conventional manner as being “owned.” Information is conserved 
by making these duties apply automatically to delineated resources 
without regard to the identity of the owner; by making the duties 
uniform; by restricting the duties to a short list of negative 
obligations, easily defined and understood by all; and by marking 
boundaries using easily observed proxies.55 
 
 48.  Id. at 390. 
 49.  See generally Steven J. Kochevar, Note, The Rise of Institutional Mortgage Lending in Early 
Nineteenth-Century New Haven, 124 YALE L.J. 158 (2014).  
 50.  Id. at 162. 
 51.  Id. at 163. 
 52.  Id. at 199.   
 53.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 38–40 (2000).  
 54.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 13, at 793.  
 55.  Id. at 794. 
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In short, property rights exist in a fixed number of forms.56 Borrowing from 
civil law countries, Merrill and Smith call the principle that property rights 
must conform to certain standardized forms numerus clausus—which, in 
Latin, means the number is closed—which “functions to promote the 
optimal standardization of property rights.”57 
In the world of numerus clausus, law is the main source of property 
rights. Merrill and Smith argue that the government, and particularly the 
legislature, should play a role in standardizing rights.58 This actually aligns 
closely to Bentham’s argument that without law there would be no rights.59 
Smith has made a famous analogy between language and property. He 
explicitly states that the grammar of a language is standardized 
spontaneously, while the source of the standardization of property rights is 
different.60 In a recent paper, Smith presents a systematic modular theory of 
in rem property rights in which the embedded legal centralism is also 
apparent.61 His modular theory presupposes a state that defines the modules 
and when re-modularization is necessary for major change, “in our legal 
system this type of change is typically channeled to legislatures.”62 In this 
Symposium, Chang and Smith distinguish between the strict form of the 
numerus clausus principle, under which only the legislature can create new 
property forms, and a broader version of the numerus clausus principle, in 
which they hypothesize that property customs that create new property 
forms and yet impose tolerable information costs are more likely to be 
recognized by courts.63 
Maybe this hypothesis should be qualified by assuming that everything 
else is equal. Information cost is important, but it is only one of the many 
factors that contribute to the evolution of property rights. Whether courts, 
legislatures, or even the executive branch is more capable of designing 
property rights is very sensitive to context. More generally, it is also doubtful 
whether law is always the main engine for property reform. For example, the 
incapacity of property law systems in developing countries has resulted in 
the prevalence of informal property rights that do not come from the formal 
law.64 In contrast to the standardized picture of in rem property, informality 
 
 56.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 54, at 3–4.  
 57.  Id. at 38.  
 58.  Id. at 60–68. 
 59.  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 57 (1975).  
 60.  Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1105, 1160 (2003).   
 61.  Smith, supra note 4, at 1709–10.  
 62.  Id. at 1724.  
 63.  Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property Customs, 
and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. XXX (forthcoming 2015).  
 64.  See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 166–68 (2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: 
THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 19–26 (1989); Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in 
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is a widely acknowledged symptom of property rights in developing 
countries. The variety of power structures and social relations has made 
property rights quite a chaotic and irregular system in many developing 
countries.65 The World Bank and other international organizations have 
devoted a lot of time and resources to formalizing these informal property 
systems but have not made substantial progress.66 The failure of legal titling 
programs in some countries, and also the uncertain effects of legal titling on 
promoting investment and economic development, have led to reflections 
on private property as a development strategy.67 Based on our previous 
review of the in rem basis of the existing property debate, this kind of 
opinion is not at all surprising, but neither is it helpful. Going beyond the 
trilogy of property debates requires us to not take the failure of one of the 
property forms as a reason for another property form to succeed. Instead, 
we should shift from choosing a relationship between resources and the 
owners to investigating the social relations with respect to the resources. 
III. RELATIONAL PROPERTY AND BOTTOM-UP INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
A. RELATIONAL PROPERTY 
Borrowing from Joseph Singer’s “property rights as social relations” and 
Ian Macneil’s “relational contract,” we develop the concept of “relational 
property” and argue that it is the basis of spontaneous order.68 The emphasis 
on social relations is far from rare in the field. For example, Carol Rose also 
argues “that property on the one hand, and the regulation of property on 
the other, are aligned in a set of overlapping evolutionary relationships.”69 
The relational property theory presents that property rights are a web of 
mutually dependent relationships.70 Property rights are defined “in terms of 
human relationships rather than relations between persons and things.”71 It 
 
Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market Without Legal Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 253, 270–71 (2014) 
[hereinafter Qiao, Planting Houses]; Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point 
Explanation, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Qiao, Small Property], available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399675; Leah M. Trzcinski & Frank 
K. Upham, Creating Law from the Ground Up: Land Law in Post-Conflict Cambodia, 1 ASIAN J.L. & 
SOC’Y 55 (2014). 
 65.  See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World 
Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1011–16 (2006).   
 66.  See Tor Krever, The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World 
Bank’s Development Model, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 304–07 (2011). See generally Trzcinski & 
Upham, supra note 64. 
 67.  Trzcinski & Upham, supra note 64.  
 68.  See generally Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 5; Macneil, Contracts, supra 
note 6. 
 69.  Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence–An 
Evolutionary Approach 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 577–78 (1990).  
 70.  Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 5, at 652.  
 71.  Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 5, at 8. 
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also aligns with “[t]he legal realists view that shifts attention from relations 
between people and things to relations among people with respect to the 
valued resource.” 72  According to the theory, rights emerge from the 
understandings that come from relationships between people that develop 
over time rather than rights being articulated and clear under the law.73 
“[P]roperty does not have a static definition but rather reflects [ever-
changing] relationships between” the government, the local community, 
and individuals over time.74 Therefore, under the theory, “[u]nderstanding 
the evolution of property rights requires an examination of the” historical 
and social contexts of human relationships with regard to property.75 
The bundle-of-sticks metaphor is at the heart of this relational property 
theory. It highlights the legal realists’ recognition “that property rights can 
be and often are disaggregated.”76 We can often observe the subtle and 
incremental adjustment and evolution of property rights, as well as the 
moments of rapid fundamental change in property systems. We can observe 
not only the shift of the right to exclude from one person to another, but 
also the evolution of the rights to use and transfer. Relational property 
accommodates the more nuanced and incremental changes in property 
rights, and it provides a platform for different stakeholders to engage and 
bargain with each other in the evolution of property rights, which can avoid 
or lessen the direct confrontation and conflicts in the contest for exclusive 
control over the piece of property. Relational property theory also 
contemplates the right to exclude, but it is more the right to exclude others 
from interfering with the exercise of that particular right, rather than the 
right to exclude others from the thing in total.77 The most important 
implication of the bundle-of-rights metaphor is that it shifts our attention 
from asking who owns the property to understanding who has what rights to 
the property and to examining the social relationships around a piece of 
property that is “beset by conflicting values and competing interests.”78 
We agree with Singer and others on the important and determining 
role of social relations in the construction of property rights, but do not 
necessarily agree with the way they characterize social relationships. For 
example, we agree with Singer that there is a basic connectedness between 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See id.; Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 5, at 618–23; Joseph William 
Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217, 218 
(1993).  
 74.  Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 75.  Id. For examples of such examinations, see generally Rose, supra note 69; Joseph L. 
Sax, Lecture, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH L. REV. 481 (1983); and 
Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990).  
 76.  Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 5, at 8.  
 77.  See id.  
 78.  Id. 
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people, but we would temper its centrality with a recognition that autonomy 
is an essential dimension of personhood.79 Moreover, different social control 
systems follow different logics, and we should not mix them, in particular, 
the social and legal relations. Singer criticizes what he calls “[t]he free 
market model” in which “rights are clearly defined at decision points” and 
individuals are “connected to each other legally in only two ways: through 
the universal community of the state or through private agreements.”80 
Though we agree with him that we should take fluid relationships into 
consideration, we disagree with him about the implications. Our focus is not 
to establish legal rights and obligations directly from social relationships, as 
in Singer’s analysis of the U.S. Steel Company case;81 rather, we are more 
interested in the mechanism of social change and how it leads to systematic 
legal change. 
Relational property also shares characteristics with Ian Macneil’s 
relational contract. Macneil argued that relational contract would be a 
solution to the “constant clash . . . between the need for stability and the 
need to respond to change” in the area of contracts.82 He argues that: 
In the neoclassical system, the reference point for those questions 
about the change tends to be the original agreement. In a truly 
relational approach the reference point is the entire relation as it 
had developed to the time of the change in question (and in many 
instances as it has developed since the change). This may or may 
not include an ‘original agreement;’ and if it does, may or may not 
result in great deference being given it.83 
Deference to social relations rather than original contract can resolve 
the conflict between change and stability. This logic also applies to the field 
of property. In the law and economics tradition, scholars tend to use the 
legal system as the reference point of property rights. This reference point, 
however, results in a conundrum: economic development requires both 
secure property rights and the ability to reallocate property in response to 
social changes. Following this logic, we must ask: how can property rights be 
adjusted and still be considered secure?84 Echoing Macneil’s insights, this 
Essay views relational property as a solution to the conundrum of stability 
and change in property. In the relational property approach, the reference 
 
 79.  See id.  
 80.  Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 5, at 652–53.  
 81.  See id. at 614–20.  
 82.  Macneil, Contracts, supra note 6, at 854.   
 83.  Id. at 890. 
 84.  See generally Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Mystery of Property Rights: A U.S. Perspective, 71 J. 
ECON. HIST. 275 (2011) (asking the same question).  
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point is the ongoing relations, rather than the original law.85 In other words, 
it is the social relationships that decide the arrangement of property rights. 
This is the difference between relational property and in rem property. 
As Chang and Smith show in this Symposium and elsewhere, the i property 
theory repeatedly recognizes the existence of social relations.86 Nevertheless, 
under the in rem property theory, social relations only play a background 
role, and property customs are marginal, assuming that countries will 
legalize these customs eventually. In contrast, the relational property theory 
recognizes that social relationships are the primary rather than 
supplementary sources of property rights. Relational property can function 
without property law, but property law cannot function without embedding 
itself in social relations. 
B. BOTTOM-UP INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
Merrill and Smith argue that “the legal realists who promoted the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor had a political agenda, namely, dethroning the 
sanctity of private property and the private ordering it enables in order to 
enhance levels of collective control and redistribution.”87 Merrill and Smith 
worry that the ability to adjust property rights “along countless margins” 
carries the implication that these rights no longer run between only the 
individual owner and the rest of the world but instead run between the 
individual and the all-powerful state.88 
We suggest that the in personam portrayal of property rights does not 
necessarily encourage state intervention, but, on the contrary, that it can 
encourage bottom-up institutional evolution.89 There is suspicion of the 
“bundle of rights” concept because “a ‘bundle,’ which, whether one speaks 
of cloths, rags, or property rights, looks like some arbitrary assemblage with 
no inner coherence, kept together only because someone ties them together 
like stalks of wheat. . . . [T]he fear is that the people who put the bundle 
together are public authorities.”90 As Richard Epstein has written, it is 
important to differentiate between “the bundle-of-rights terminology” and 
“the question of whether we think of property rights from a top-down or 
 
 85.  Macneil, Contracts, supra note 6, at 890.  
 86.  See generally Chang & Smith, supra note 15; Chang & Smith, supra note 63; Henry E. 
Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009); Henry E. 
Smith, Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 507 (2013).  
 87.  Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle of Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill 
and Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 216 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
S77, S83 (2011)).  
 88.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 87, at S82. 
 89.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist 
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223 (2011).   
 90.  Id. at 225.   
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bottom-up perspective,” which is ultimately a political choice.91 There is 
nothing in the bundle-of-rights conception that makes it more amenable to 
the top-down approach. Rather, because it keeps the freedom of individual 
choice, it can be more consistent with the bottom-up approach. According 
to Epstein, “[s]o long as we know how the rights were separated and how 
they could be reassembled, we can let the parties decide how they choose to 
interact among themselves and with the outside world.”92 Or as Singer and 
others have said, “the crucial question is not just the rights of the individual 
owner vis-à-vis the state but the right relationships that must be established 
between that owner and others in the community.”93 
An important question is whether justifications for a centralized 
property system are persuasive enough to sacrifice institutional diversity as 
well as individual and communal autonomy. According to James Scott, 
ancient emperors always wanted comprehensive information about their 
subjects’ properties so that they could collect taxes easily.94 To achieve this 
clarity, they were willing to sacrifice the complexity and diversity of their 
empires. 95  Thus, the in rem property theory and the numerus clausus 
principle might have been adopted by civil law countries not to reduce 
information costs, but simply to ease the emperors’ rule. As Merrill and 
Smith would agree, institutional comparison “must be sensitive to context.”96 
It might be better to leave the construction of property rights to the existing 
specific social relations. 
C. FROM CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITY TO UNBOUNDED NETWORK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 
A fundamental issue with relational property, however, is the 
constitutive role of social norms: are these norms limited to close-knit 
communities and, therefore, incapable of serving as the basis of a society? 
Robert Ellickson’s pioneer work launched the law and social norms 
movement in the legal academy. Both of his books—Order Without Law: How 
Neighbors Settle Disputes and the more recent The Household: Informal Order 
around the Hearth—are about property rights relations in close-knit 
communities.97 He also qualifies his order-without-law thesis within close-
 
 91.  Id. at 227.  
 92.  Id. at 233.  
 93.  Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, 
and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 331 (2006) (citing Laura S. Underkuffler, 
Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 
751 (2004)). 
 94.  JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE 
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 23 (1998). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 53, at 68.  
 97.  See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW]; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE 
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knit communities,98 leaving open the question whether social norms can 
arise in contexts with more anonymous subjects or fewer repeat players, 
including what Lior Strahilevitz calls “loose-knit groups” and “intermediate-
knit groups.”99 Regarding the conventional wisdom that a well-functioning 
property law system is the foundation of the economy and society, it is 
important to ask whether society-wide property norms can arise.100 Based on 
social network theory, we argue that property rights can arise in an 
unbounded network of social relations. 
An important discovery of social network theory is that most human 
social networks are scale free.101 There are numerous close-knit communities 
in the world, but they are not isolated; rather, they are connected to each 
other.102 Two theories have proven this. 
The first is called the six degrees of separation, which means that 
everyone and everything is six or fewer steps away, by way of introduction, 
from any other person in the world, so that a chain of “a friend of a friend” 
statements can be made to connect any two people in a maximum of six 
steps.103 Supportive facts include “that the actor Kevin Bacon could be 
connected to virtually all of the roughly half a million people who had acted 
in feature films since 1898.”104 As Strahilevitz comments, “[T]here are 
people who stay in touch with old friends, throw dinner parties, play 
matchmaker, and, most importantly, have close friends in a variety of 
different cliques. These are the Kevin Bacons of the world: society’s 
supernodes.”105 
The second one is what Granovetter calls “the strength of weak ties.”106 
As he writes, “What makes cultural diffusion possible, then, is the fact that 
 
HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, THE 
HOUSEHOLD].  
 98.  Compare ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 97, at 123 (explaining the 
theory of informal norms that achieve order without law), with ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD, 
supra note 97, at 92 (showing household relationships provide order without external legal 
rules). 
 99.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 359, 360 (2003). 
 100.  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 508 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 
IND. L.J. 1231, 1232 (2000). 
 101.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 947–53 
(2005). 
 102.  Id. at 958. 
 103.  See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 101, at 949. See generally JOHN GUARE, SIX DEGREES OF 
SEPARATION: A PLAY (1990). 
 104.  Strahilevitz, supra note 101, at 949. 
 105.  Id. at 951. 
 106.  Id. at 954. See generally Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory 
Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983). 
QIAO_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2015  6:20 PM 
2015] RELATIONAL PROPERTY 117 
small cohesive groups who are liable to share a culture are not so cohesive 
that they are entirely closed; rather, ideas may penetrate from other such 
groups via the connecting medium of weak ties.”107 “Weak ties serve a 
‘bridging’ function, transferring new information from one closely knit 
group to another.”108 
Such theories remind us of the possibility that social relations can be 
built beyond close-knit communities. In fact, social network analysis has 
been widely applied in the social sciences, and is based on the relationships 
among interacting units.109 “The fundamental difference between a social 
network explanation and a non-network explanation of a process is the 
inclusion of concepts and information on relationships among units in a 
study.”110 A network approach examines how members influence each other 
in order to make a decision by looking at interactions among network 
members. 111  “[R]elations defined by linkages among units are a 
fundamental component of network theories.”112 In social network analysis, 
“[a]ctors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent units,” and “[r]elational ties . . . between actors are channels 
for transfer or ‘flow’ of resources.”113 These characteristics of social network 
theory make it align well with the relational property theory. 
IV. CHINESE RURAL LAND REFORM: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RELATIONS 
We can develop four hypotheses from the relational property concept. 
First, it is easier to define the stakeholders’ rights than it is to answer who 
owns the property. Second, besides the right to exclude, other sticks in the 
bundle of rights may also play a major role in the evolution of property 
rights. Third, since property rights are created and defined by social 
relations, when property law lags behind property relations, the latter 
prevails. Fourth, property rights are relational, rather than absolute and, 
thus, need to be defined by specific social relationships. Similar actors in the 
same institutional background might have opposite property arrangements. 
An examination of the reform of Chinese rural land will illustrate these four 
hypotheses. 
 
 107.  Id. at 956 (quoting Granovetter, supra note 106, at 215–16). 
 108.  Id. at 955 (quoting Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the 
Flow of Information and Influence, 5 SOC. NETWORKS, 245, 246 (1983)).  
 109.  STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS 4 (1994).   
 110.  Id. at 6. 
 111.  Id. at 7. 
 112.  Id. at 4. 
 113.  Id.  
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A. WHO OWNS CHINA’S LAND? 
Who owns China’s land? There is no short answer because the question 
is misleading. It assumes an exclusive relationship between land and either 
the state, communities, or individuals or private entities. This conventional 
view further holds private “sole and despotic dominion” over real estate as 
the benchmark for comparison.114 As a result, several phrases have been 
invented to depict developments in the Chinese property regime, such as 
quasi-private ownership115 and incomplete property rights.116 Chinese land 
reform, however, is not simply the transfer of exclusive control from the 
public to the private. This in rem picture of property rights is inconsistent 
with Chinese reality. Rather, the right approach is to examine how the 
bundle of rights to Chinese land has been rearranged in the past three 
decades. 
The current land regime in rural China is a tri-party model: (1) The 
collective exercises ownership; (2) individual households enjoy use rights; 
and (3) the government monopolizes the rural–urban land conversion, 
which is the primary way to transfer land. In this model, the right to exclude 
is hard to define, but the bundle of rights of each stakeholder can be 
defined. 
1. The Collective’s Ownership 
Article 10 of the Chinese Constitution says that rural land is collectively 
owned except for that owned by the state.117 This stipulation is confirmed by 
Article 8 of the Land Administration Law (“LAL”) and Article 59 of the 
Chinese Property Law.118 Both statutes designate the villagers’ committee, 
the villagers’ group, or corresponding collective economic organizations as 
the body empowered to exercise collective ownership and manage the 
collectively owned land.119 In Shenzhen and some other places, the form of 
collective economic organizations is the village co-op.120 
 
 114.  See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *2.  
 115.  See, e.g., James Kai-sing Kung, Choice of Land Tenure in China: The Case of a County with 
Quasi-Private Property Rights, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 793 (2002). 
 116.  See, e.g., Michael T. Bennett, Aashish Mehta & Jintao Xu, Incomplete Property Rights, 
Exposure to Markets and the Provision of Environmental Services in China, 22 CHINA ECON. REV. 485 
(2011). 
 117.  XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 10 (2004) (China). 
 118.  Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the National People’s 
Congress of China, Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 59 (China) [hereinafter Property 
Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118. 
htm; Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee, June 25, 1986, revised on December 29, 1988, Aug. 
29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004) art. 8 (China) [hereinafter Land Administration Law], available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm. 
 119. Article 10 of LAL says:  
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The core of collective ownership is the right to contract rural land to 
individual households. Most of the time, the villagers’ committee or 
villagers’ group represents the collective in exercising ownership. Chinese 
farmers refer to both institutions as “the collective” to distinguish it from 
“the state.” 
2. Farmers’ Use Right to Rural Land 
In 1993, Article 8 of the Chinese Constitution recognized the 
Household Responsibility System (“HRS”) as the basic rural property 
institution,121 which was subsequently confirmed by the 2002 Rural Land 
Contract Law122 and the 2007 Chinese Property Law.123 HRS ensures that 
the collective should contract collectively owned land to individual 
households. Individual households as contractors of rural land are free to 
use the contracted land for agriculture. The contract term has been legally 
fixed at 30 years, 124 which can be extended. There are comprehensive 
measures to protect rural households’ contract rights. After contracting the 
land to individual households, the collective has little right to intervene in 
the farmers’ use of the contracted land for agriculture.125 At the same time, 
there are a series of restrictions for households to transfer their use rights: 
(1) they have to get the agreement of the collective; (2) they cannot change 
the agricultural use of the land; and (3) members of the same collective 
enjoy priority in buying transferred rights to contracted land.126 
Besides engaging in agricultural activities, farmers need shelter for their 
families. Each household of the collective is eligible for and can get one 
 
The land owned by the farmers’ collective is by law owned by the farmers’ 
collective of the village, and managed and administered by the village collective 
economic organization or the villagers’ committee; what is already owned by more 
than two rural collective economic organizations of the farmers’ collective is 
managed and administered by each of these rural collective economic 
organizations or the villagers’ groups; what is already owned by the farmers’ 
collective of the township is managed and administered by the rural collective 
economic organization of the township. 
Land Administration Law, art. 10. 
 120.  Qiao, Planting Houses, supra note 64, at 260–61.   
 121.  XIANFA art. 8 (2004) (China). 
 122.  Law of the People’s Republic of China on Land Contract in Rural Areas (adopted by 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee of China, Aug. 29, 2002, effective Aug. 29, 
2002), art. 35 (China) [hereinafter Rural Land Contract Law], available at http://www.npc.gov. 
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm.  
 123.  See Property Law, art. 124. 
 124.  See Land Administration Law, art. 14. In 2008, at the third plenary session of the 17th 
central committee, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a decision that the contract term of 
rural land should be kept stable and unchanged for a long time, which was interpreted by many 
Chinese scholars as a signal to further strengthen the security of farmers’ rights to land.  
 125.  See Rural Land Contract Law, art. 1 
 126.  See id. art. 35, 37. 
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piece of rural residential land for free to build a house.127 Rural land is 
supposed to be used only by farmers for agricultural use and other daily 
operations. Article 63 of LAL explicitly prohibits alienation of rural land use 
rights for non-agricultural use.128 In particular, urban residents are not 
allowed to buy rural houses or rural residential plots. This prohibition has 
been resoundingly affirmed in various government ordinances.129 
3. State Monopoly on Rural–Urban Land Conversion 
Urban land is state owned, and rural land is collectively owned. This 
distinction between rural and urban land is fixed in Article 10 of the 
Chinese Constitution.130 Preservation of agricultural land is one of the 
Chinese land administration regime’s most important goals. As a result, 
rural land can be used only for agriculture and related purposes, including 
building residential houses, public facilities, public goods, and township-
and-village enterprises. 
Rural–urban land conversion can be legally achieved only through 
“requisition,” roughly equivalent to eminent domain, by the state. Section I 
of Article 43 of the 2004 LAL states that “[a]ll units and individuals that 
need land for construction purposes shall, in accordance with law, apply for 
the use of State-owned land.”131 This clause makes the private transfer of 
rural land-use rights for non-rural use legally impossible. Moreover, Section 
II of Article 43 reiterates that state-owned land in Section I includes both 
state-owned land and land that the state has requisitioned, which effectively 
means that rural land can be used for construction only after requisition. 
Although state requisition of rural land is legally limited to the public 
interest and constrained by procedural requirements, these restrictions have 
not been effective. Rapid and massive urbanization has meant that, in 
reality, these legal rules are either ignored or relaxed. For example, the 
requirement of public interest rarely precludes local governments in China 
from requisitioning rural land for industrial or commercial development.132 
 
 127.  Land Administration Law, art. 62. 
 128.  There is one exception to this prohibition: in the situation of bankruptcy and 
amalgamation, use right to rural land of enterprises can be transferred. This exception was 
designed to promote the development of township-and-village enterprises. See Land 
Administration Law, art. 63.   
 129. See, e.g., Guowuyuan guanyu shenhua gaige yange tudi guanli de jueding [Decision of the State 
Council on Deepening Reform and Strengthening Land Administration], No. 28 (2004); Guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu yange zhixing youguan nongcun jiti jianshe yongdi falv he zhengce de tongzhi [Notice 
of the Office of the State Council on Strictly Implementing Laws and Policies Relevant to Rural Collective 
Construction Land], No. 71 (2007).  
 130.  XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China).  
 131.  Land Administration Law, art. 43.  
 132.  See Shitong Qiao, Chinese Small Property: The Co-Evolution of Law and Social Norms 
ch. 1 (forthcoming May 2015) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with 
author). Of course the similar American constitutional limitation of eminent domain to “public 
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The government alienates the use rights to state-owned land in two 
ways: free allocation (in several limited situations) and sale, which together 
constitute the “primary market” for urban land-use rights. The initial and 
subsequent non-government holders of land-use rights may further transfer 
them within certain limits. These further land transactions constitute the 
“secondary market” for urban land-use rights. 
B. SMALL PROPERTY: A ONE-STICK EVOLUTION 
As shown above, a key issue for Chinese rural land reform is the right to 
develop and sell rural land for non-agricultural uses. It is just one (or maybe 
two, depending on how one defines a property right) stick of property 
rights, and it is not the right to exclude. 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources, by 2007 
Chinese farmers had built over 6.6 billion square meters of houses 
in contravention of the legal prohibition on private rural land 
development and transfer. The result was a huge market for illegal 
housing. By way of comparison, in 2007 the total floor space of 
housing sold on the legal housing market was only 0.76 billion 
square meters. People in China call these illegal buildings “small-
property houses” (xiaochanquan in Chinese) because their property 
rights are “smaller” (weaker) than those on the urban/legal 
housing market, which have “big” property rights protected by the 
government.133 
Shenzhen, a city in the southern part of Southern China’s Guangdong 
Province which is situated immediately north of Hong Kong, has been the 
literal and symbolic heart of the Chinese economic miracle.134 
Shenzhen is the city with the highest ratio of small-property houses 
to total floor space, where small-property houses contribute 
47.57% of total floor space, compared to 30% in Xi’An and 20% 
in Beijing. These illegal buildings, without legal titles and 
concentrated in 320 intra-city villages, host most of the 8 million 
migrant workers in Shenzhen and are the main livelihood of the 
more than 300,000 local villagers.135 
The small-property market has resulted from the changing economic, 
political, and social relations between villagers, government agencies, and 
other related actors. In particular, a network of market participants has 
 
use” has been similarly broadly interpreted. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 
2655 (2005). 
 133.  Qiao, Small Property, supra note 64 (manuscript at 3–4) (footnotes omitted). 
 134.  See, e.g., Howard W. French, Chinese Success Story Chokes on Its Own Growth, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/19/world/asia/19shenzhen.html.  
 135.  Qiao, Small Property, supra note 64 (manuscript at 4) (footnote omitted).   
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grown from actors with strong ties with each other to actors with weak ties, 
and from bounded to unbounded. The property arrangement that a villager 
or a group of villagers can and would make is determined by its unique 
position in the social network. The scope, content, and strength of this 
property arrangement also change over time as social conditions and 
relationships change. 
This market symbolizes the evolution of land rights in China without 
serious conflicts among the government, the village community, and 
individual villagers. This is attributed to the relational property structure, 
which provides a platform for stakeholders to adjust their behavior to 
changing social relations. 
1. Social Relations (Not Law) Decide Property Rights 
In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up”136 policy 
proved that the communist prohibition on land alienation would not work 
in a market-oriented economy. This inadaptability was most acute in the 
urban area, where both urban construction and cooperation with foreign 
investors could benefit greatly from land development and transfer. As a 
result, in 1988, China amended both the Constitution and LAL, stating that 
use rights to both state-owned and collective-owned land could “be 
transferred according to law.” 137  On May 19, 1990, the State Council 
promulgated detailed rules governing the sales of urban land-use rights 
from the government and the transfer of those rights among land users.138 
This urban land-use reform not only built the legal basis for China’s 
urban real-estate market, but it also made land the most important source of 
revenue for Chinese local governments. Local governments requisition rural 
land at compensation equal to its agricultural value and sell the same land 
on the urban land market for 50 or more times their cost. 139 As a result, the 
more the urban real-estate market develops, the more unlikely that the 
central and local governments will liberalize rural land development and 
transfer. Even partial liberalization would jeopardize the governments’ 
monopoly over land.140 
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government has never promulgated legal 
authorization for the transfer of rural land-use rights. Instead, in 1998, the 
 
 136.  See e.g., David Wall, China’s Economic Reform and Opening‐Up Process: The Role of the 
Special Economic Zones, 11 DEV. POL’Y REV. 239, 243–60 (1993).  
 137.  XIANFA art. 2 (1988) (China) (amending art. 10). 
 138.  中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例 [Interim Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of 
the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas] (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), available at http://www.lawinfochina. 
com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1320&CGid=. 
 139.  Compensation for the requisitioned rural land is mainly based on its agricultural 
output, but the government transfers it at urban land market price.  
 140.  See Qiao, supra note 132, at 45–46. 
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Chinese government made a comprehensive revision to LAL that excluded 
the possibility to transfer rural land-use rights. The 1998 revision also made 
it clear that rural–urban land conversion can only be legally achieved 
through state requisition.141 
Nevertheless, the evolution of social relations still leads to change in 
property rights. Legitimate organizations and professionals have developed a 
network to facilitate impersonal transactions of small-property real estate, 
essentially shifting the right to develop and sell rural land from the 
government to farmers and other social entrepreneurs. 
Each village in Shenzhen had one or more so-called industrial 
zones, in which factories were built and investments were received 
from Hong Kong and other parts of China. Most . . . were called 
joint ventures, meaning that villages contributed factories and 
investors contributed money, technology, and management. This 
was the early [phase] of capitalization of rural land in Shenzhen. 
The Shenzhen government encouraged investment in villages and 
issued rules, such as guidelines for land leasing rates, on the 
capitalization of rural land[, notwithstanding the then-effective 
constitutional prohibition on alienation of land]. [Once 
investment came], factories were built and villages became 
[commercial] centers. Millions of migrant workers arrived, 
primarily to work in factories. In the 1980s, the supply of housing 
was the responsibility of the local government, which was unable 
[to build houses to] even satisfy the housing needs of its own 
employees . . . .142 
Migrant workers, who are the main force of Shenzhen’s foreign-
investment sectors, were not even counted in the Shenzhen government’s 
plan of housing supply because they were not legal residents of the city.143 
The huge demand for houses made rural land development and transfer 
very profitable. But the government still generally prohibited rural land 
development and transfer, except for allowing villages to rent their land to 
investors for building factories. Breaking this legal prohibition would be a 
very profitable change. 
But how did the challenge to the legal prohibition occur? A network of 
members essential to the villages’ economic development first blazed the 
trail of illegal rural land development and transfer. These “supernodes” of 
the society transmitted the information and practices to other 
 
 141.  Id. at 47–51. 
 142.  Qiao, Planting Houses, supra note 64, at 258.   
 143.  See, e.g., Weiping Wu, Migrant Housing in Urban China: Choices and Constraints, 38 URB. 
AFF. REV. 90, 99 (2002) (“Migrants are largely excluded from the mainstream housing 
distribution system, as the linkage between household registration and urban housing is largely 
intact.”).  
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communities.144 Eventually, this new property arrangement, though not 
officially sanctioned, transformed the social relations of the whole city and 
even led to legal changes. Following are representative stories from 
interviews with village heads, government officials, and other participants. 
A Hong Kong investor, after establishing a business in a Shenzhen 
village, wanted to buy a plot for his own house. Considering that he had to 
stay in the village for more than 200 days a year and even had some family 
there, this need was reasonable. He contacted the village co-op head with his 
request. The village co-op head had done everything to attract and satisfy 
outside investors because building joint ventures with outside investors was 
the village’s main business. He was also aware of the government reform of 
the urban land-use system and expected rural land-use reform to be the next 
step. As a result, the village co-op head approved this request and sold a plot 
to the Hong Kong investor—an act illegal at the time. 
Social entrepreneurs included not only Hong Kong investors, but also 
other major players in Shenzhen’s rural industrialization. Government 
agencies responsible for investment approval and land administration, such 
as the Bureau of Land Administration (“BLA”) and the Bureau of 
Investment Promotion (“BIP”), had observed all the above moves and even 
studied the legal and policy issues. As a result, they determined that the 
need for rural land development and transfer was so powerful that it would 
probably become a trend. The old government housing allocation system 
had not been able to keep up with the explosive increase in population. 
Bureau directors were probably troubled by how to house their employees. 
In a dinner conversation, a village committee member, after listening to the 
director of BIP complaining about employee housing, said, “Hey, buddy, 
why don’t you build apartments for your employees on my land?”145 
When a developer, having completing a contract to prepare land for a 
village development, was told by the village head over dinner that there was 
no money to pay him, he was offered other village land instead.146 The 
developer would have preferred cash, but with few choices, gaining the land 
was the second best deal. Further, through contacts with village co-ops, 
government officials, and Hong Kong investors, his business would develop 
if he took the deal. Thus, he accepted this offer. That was how one luxury 
neighborhood in Shenzhen came about.147 
Later, the land transactions above encouraged other related people and 
institutions to buy and sell rural land. The related people included a village 
head (who had managed all the transactions with Hong Kong investors and 
 
 144.  Strahilevitz, supra note 101, at 951–52.  
 145.  Interview with a village committee member, in Shenzhen, Guangdong, China (Mar. 
10, 2012). 
 146.  Interview with an owner of a villa in the neighborhood, in Shenzhen, Guangdong, 
China (Mar. 10, 2012). 
 147.  Id. 
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government agencies, and who wanted to develop and transfer some of the 
excess land he was allocated), an official in the BIP (who did not get an 
apartment from the bureau but had some money), other government 
employees (who learned about the deal from their friends in the BIP or BLA 
as a way to resolve their housing shortage), and a migrant worker (who 
made enough money).148 Government employees participated so widely in 
rural land development and transfer that the Shenzhen government had to 
take special measures to address this situation in the 1980s.149 
After this cluster of social entrepreneurs made the first move, their 
friends and relatives followed. The social entrepreneurs were all 
influential people in their social networks and, thus, had much 
more weight in influencing the changing of norms. Further 
transactions encouraged more transactions, and this continued 
until the formation of a small-property market in Shenzhen . . . .150 
In the latter stage, small-property development and transactions became 
more professional, with the involvement of lawyers, real estate brokers, and a 
local bank as market intermediaries.151 As one of us has explained elsewhere: 
[D]ifferent levels and different departments of the government are 
involved in the network of small-property institutions. Some 
disregard the illegality of small-properties and incorporate them 
into their official systems in order to effectively address issues such 
as the monitoring of population migration and the physical site 
requirements for business operation. Some try to enforce the land 
law and fight against small property. But without the support of 
other levels and agencies of the local government, the effect of 
legal enforcement is limited. Further, bribery becomes a weapon 
for market participants, who use it to reduce the risk of legal action 
being taken against them.152 
The following figure illustrates a typical small-property network.153 
 
 148.  Interview with a retired government official (Mar. 13, 2012).  
 149.  Shenzhen government’s declarations prohibiting its employees from participating in 
rural land development were often seen on the first pages of the Shenzhen SEZ Daily in the 
1980s, a testament to the prevalence of the practice. See, e.g., Building Houses Illegally, Chen 
Huang Being Fired from His Office (违章建私房、陈煌被撤职 ), SHENZHEN SEZ DAILY (深圳特区) 
(Sept. 8, 1981); The Office of the City Government Declared that All Illegal Buildings Would Be 
Confiscated (市政府办公厅宣布继续违章乱建私房一律没收)，SHENZHEN SEZ DAILY (深圳特区) 
(Apr. 3,1985).  
 150.  Qiao, Small Property, supra note 64 (manuscript at 31) (footnotes omitted). See generally 
Timur Kuran, Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution, 61 PUB. 
CHOICE 41 (1989); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to 
the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997).  
 151.  Qiao, Planting Houses, supra note 64, at 263.   
 152.  Id. at 269.  
 153.  See id. (setting forth a previous version of this diagram).   
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Figure 1. A Network of Small Property 
 
“This expanded network further reduces the risk of government 
demolition of small properties and increases the credibility of small-property 
transactions by including local government agencies and branches. It 
provides a stronger core for the bigger, boundless network through which 
millions of people engage in impersonal transactions involving small 
properties.”154 
 
 154.  Id. at 270.   
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2. The Same Market, Differentiated Property Relations 
The emergence of a small-property market has accompanied 
Shenzhen’s rapid urbanization since 1978. 155  Facing the same market 
demand and the same formal institutional structure, however, villages have 
had different destinies. Some villages made their members millionaires and 
even billionaires, i.e., they gained the city government’s recognition of their 
rights to develop and sell their land, which were cashed out through village 
redevelopment projects. Some villages’ development of rural land was 
strictly restrained by the city government for environmental and other kinds 
of considerations, i.e., their rights to develop their land were not recognized 
and villagers remain poor. Some villages’ small-property businesses were 
warned and fined by the government, and they even became a target of 
criminal prosecution. And many other villages are still on their way to 
gaining government-recognized rights to develop and sell their land.156 
Sometimes, even across a small river, completely different pictures 
emerge. On one side is a village full of small-property construction where 
villagers have shown no respect for the legal prohibition on rural land 
development and transfer and have “planted” as many houses as possible in 
each vacant plot.157 On the other side is a village in which the village co-ops 
have restricted construction because these co-ops chose to apply for legal 
rights to develop and sell their land from the local government. 
In one case, Wanfeng village and its leader were prosecuted for bribing 
government officials to cover up their small-property business, and the 
leader was also convicted for participating in a criminal organization, of 
which the main business was buying and selling small property. In another 
case, Zhangshubu village co-op from time to time took action “in the name 
of law” in their bargaining for legal property rights with the government and 
with a hold-out couple who refused to submit their “nail house” (the 
Chinese term for such buildings because they stick out and are difficult to 
remove, like a stubborn nail) to the village co-op for redevelopment.158 
From a purely economic or legal perspective, there should be no 
difference in small-property development across different villages. Though, 
there may be a difference in the degree of market development, the typical 
Demsetzian story would be that private land rights emerged in response to 
 
 155.  See Qiao, Small Property, supra note 64 (manuscript at 4–8) (discussing the historical 
emergence and growth of Shenzhen’s small-property market).  
 156.  See SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY (南方都市报编著), NO INTRA-CITY VILLAGE IN THE 
FUTURE (未来没有城中村) (2011).  
 157.  See Qiao, Planting Houses, supra note 64, at 255.  
 158.  For a photograph of a Chinese “nail house,” see Stubborn as a Nail: China Residents Who 
Refuse to Move, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/International/photos/stubborn-nail-china-
residents-refuse-move-19827908/image-19828396 (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). For a scholarly 
discussion of such a case, see Shitong Qiao, Stopping Land Grabs by Privatization in Rural 
China: Illusion or Reality? (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).   
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the increasing demand for housing.159 But this story would raise a question 
as to why some villages go white and some go black.160 The reasons cannot 
be sought solely from the market or legal system, but must also be sought by 
examining the social relations within a village. In particular, one should 
examine the relations between village co-op leaders and its members and 
external social relations of the village co-op, especially with varying levels of 
the government.161 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Essay does not set out to challenge the information cost theory of 
in rem property, and the Essay does not argue that the right to exclude is 
not important. We do, however, believe that the in rem property theory 
undervalues the social relationships in which property rights are embedded. 
In the Chinese context, the question of who owns the land is too difficult to 
answer, and because of this, we decided to go a different route. We find that 
the concept of relational property fits better into the landscape of Chinese 
rural land reform and other evolutionary stories of property rights that have 
been ignored in law and economics. Since there is no simple and uniform 
answer to the comparative institutional capacities of governments, 
communities, or markets,162 it is better to evaluate the related institutions 
and institutional stakeholders comprehensively in a particular context 
before we decide which form of property rights should and could prevail. 
That is why we find the concept of relational property helpful. This 
relational property concept is an attempt to bring social relations, which law 
and society scholars are enthusiastic about, to the heart of the economics of 
property law. The cases we present do not necessarily represent the most 
efficient property systems, but they represent social reality and deserve 
greater attention. 
 
 
 159.  See Demsetz, supra note 28, at 356.  
 160.  Chinese use color to distinguish the legality of organizations and their activities. For 
example, “black” means illegal and often involves mafia marked by violence and crime, and 
“white” means legal and official recognition. For most occasions, small property is “grey,” i.e., 
between black and white.  
 161.  For more details, see Qiao, supra note 132, at 154–206.  
 162.  See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 271–76 (1994). 
